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Since the mid 1980s, most of Europe and thedeveloped world experienced an unprecedented
wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) that only
faded away during the economic downturn at the
beginning of the 21st century. In 2000, the global
market for M&As represented USD 3.498 billion1
(UN 2002). Germany, together with the US and the
UK, was one of the three most important markets
for M&As (Kang and Johansson 2000). During the
1990s alone, almost 30,000 corporate takeovers
involved at least one German firm; the value of cor-
porate transactions here attained a volume of EUR
199 billion in 1999 and EUR 487 billion in 2000, com-
pared to EUR 26 billion in 1990 (M&A 2003).
This massive number of takeovers2 has led to impor-
tant changes not just in the structure of businesses,
but also to a thorough reshuffling in the location of
economic activity and decision-making. Yet, whereas
research on corporate takeovers from a microeco-
nomic perspective is extensive, the number of empir-
ical studies examining their overall effects on the
location of economic activity is still relatively small
(e.g. Chapman 2003; Markusen 2003). Taking the
M&A Review database of the German Handelsblatt
group as the source of data, the present article thus
explores the reshuffling in the location of economic
activity in Germany over the last decade, with par-
ticular attention being paid to the role and increas-
ing interconnection of metropolitan regions as major
nodes of economic power and control.
Corporate takeovers in spatial perspective 
As today’s dominant form of foreign direct invest-
ment in developed countries, M&As have become
one of the main drivers of industrial restructuring.
Firms engage in M&A activity for several reasons.
The basic strategic corporate objectives include the
search for new markets, increased market power and
dominance, greater size and scope, efficiency gains
through synergies, and geographic and product line
diversification, i.e. the spreading of risk. Corporate
takeovers enable firms to quickly access strategic
assets, such as skilled labour, patents, brands, licens-
es, or management skills (Porter 1990; Trautwein
1990; Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993; Dunning
1997). Further central factors motivating firms to
undertake M&As are financial enticements – like
tax treatment and subsidies, transfer pricing, trade
barriers, transportation costs, or monopoly type
practices (Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987; Healy et al.
1992; Loughran and Vij 1997; compare also Clark
1993; Wrigley 1999) – and personal or behavioural
attributes (Shleifer and Vishny 1989; Avery et al.
1998; Shinn 1999).
The basic rationale behind M&As is thus one of
achieving greater efficiency. But corporate takeovers
and mergers not only lead to firm restructuring and
economic change (see Curry and George 1983;
Jensen and Ruback 1983; Davies and Lyons 1996;
Nilsson and Schamp 1996). They also have profound
political and socio-institutional implications and are
by no means an ‘aspatial phenomenon’: strategic
decisions on the transfer of assets and control affect
not only the firms involved, but also both the loca-
tions and environment with which they are associat-
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1 After 2000, the volume of transactions quickly waned to USD
1.753 billion in 2001 and to USD 1.230 billion in 2002 (UN 2003;
Thomson Financial 2003).
2 Takeovers (or acquisitions) indicate the purchase of a company by
transferring the control of assets and operations from one firm to
the other, the former becoming an affiliate of the acquirer.A merg-
er, on the other hand, implies the combination of the assets and
operations of two firms to establish a new entity whose control
resides in a team from one or both of the two. Despite these differ-
ences, M&As are usually bundled together for most purposes.
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If considered in their totality, the spatial distribution
of M&As intensely affects the overall organisation
of an economy through modifications in regional
and urban structures: The changing ownership con-
figuration and the resulting transfer of the corporate
locus of control as well as the shifting of assets and
personnel across geographic areas and industries
adversely affects the localities involved. M&As thus
cause fundamental change in corporate space and
increase the risk of external domination of segments
of a local economy. Companies and establishments
at peripheral regions, for instance, have become
increasingly owned und ultimately controlled by
firms headquartered in core regions (Chapman and
Edmond 2000). The possibility to exercise ultimate
control from headquarters located in a different
region than the other parts of the business accord-
ingly facilitated the expansion of contemporary cor-
porations’ power networks.
As decisions made at the highest level of corporate
control directly influence the growth and develop-
ment of city systems, the performance of major cor-
porations has great impact on interrelationships in a
nation’s urban structure (Green 1990). M&A activi-
ty has thus to be conceived as a paramount driver of
the particular role of cities as increasingly concen-
trated locations of power and control (Friedman
1986, Sassen 1991, 2000, Castells 1996, Taylor 2000,
Duranton and Puga 2003 and others on the theory of
globalised urban networks). Extending this theory,
Veltz (1996) argues that the functional links between
cities with similar roles in the world economy are
strengthened beyond physical contiguity; in his
’archipelago economy’ approach, he proposes that
the connections between cities are greatly enhanced,
whereas they become increasingly detached from
their regional contexts and hinterlands (Veltz 2000,
33–38). Representing important stationary reloca-
tion processes that permit the transfer or corporate
power from one metropolitan complex to another,
corporate takeovers therefore strengthen the
increased interconnectivity between large urban
areas.
In sum, M&As reinforce the spatial concentration of
economic activity, the resulting disparities in region-
al development, and the changes and linkages in an
economy’s metropolitan hierarchy. Hence, the con-
centration of power and control resulting from
M&A activity has implications for regional develop-
ment and indicates the importance of corporate
strategy and the spatial organisation of production
to metropolitan systems.
Data and methodology 
The source of the data, on which our empirical
analysis is based, is the M&A Review Database, the
most comprehensive record of recent M&A activity
in Germany. It offers information on more than
29,000 M&As that took place in the 1990s, in which
at least one German firm was involved, and classifies
– whenever possible – each acquisition by location,
industry and type.3 As with all data sources on
M&As (see e.g. Green and Mayer 1997; Chapman
and Edmond 2000), there is unfortunately little
information on the value of the transactions, i.e. the
economic significance of an acquisition. Never-
theless, frequency counts represent a good indicator
of the overall level of M&A activity and its wide-
ranging trends.4
From a methodological point of view, the analysis
builds, in essence, on the application of a location
quotient. Via standardisation by regional GDP, the
index MApR-I(gdp)5 identifies the relative, i.e. the
weighted burden of M&As in each of the 40
German counties (Regierungsbezirke, the primary
administrative divisions of the Länder). The entire
number of close to 24,600 corporate takeovers con-
tained in the database, in which the acquiring firm
was a German one, were used for the calculation of
the quotient, after having discarded those cases
3 The database is maintained by the University of St. Gallen and
can be accessed via the platform Genios Wirtschaftsdatenbanken.
Due to missing entries (see below), the present study does not
cover all 29,385 transactions contained in the dataset, of which
7,765 are transnational.
4 No distinction is made between mergers and acquisitions in this
paper. Given international trends – 97 percent of all cross-border
M&As included in the World Development Report were defined as
acquisitions (UN 2000) – it can be assumed, however, that the great
majority of transactions are in fact acquisitions or corporate take-
overs.
5 MApR(gdp)-I is calculated according to the following formula:
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where MA depicts the absolute number of M&A transactions,
GDP denotes the regional GDP (in EUR million), t0 and t1 denote
the period of analysis, i stands for the regional unit of analysis
(Regierungsbezirk) and Ger, finally, corresponds to the whole of
Germany. The German average equals one.
included in the database for which no exact geo-
graphical information was given. Before turning to
the series of maps that visually demonstrate the
location quotient and highlight the main changes in
the German geography of M&As during the peri-
od under investigation, some more general charac-
teristics of the economy’s takeover landscape are
outlined.
Reshaping the economic decision-making in
Germany 
German economic geography of M&As, as
observed in the 1990s, has three important features.
First of all, there is the key role played by
economies of proximity and agglomeration in cor-
porate takeovers in Germany. By far the greatest
share of M&As occurred either within the same
county, or among large metropolitan areas. In more
than a third of all German M&As during the 1990s,
the acquiring firm and its target were located in the
same county (see Rodríguez-Pose and Zademach
2003 for more detail). Apart from localisation
economies (external to the firm, internal to the
industry) and urbanisation economies (external to
the industry, internal to the local economy, for
example skilled labour pooling, knowledge
spillovers and scale economies in infrastructure
provision), other factors, such as the role played by
institutional investors deserve special attention as
potential determinants of this huge geographical
concentration of M&As. For financial intermedi-
aries such as banks and insurance companies and
the Länder – being particularly relevant in the
“German model” of corporate governance as the
primary owners of companies on the local and
regional level (Gorton and Schmidt 1996; Streeck
1997; Berndt 1998; Franks and Meyer 2001; Wójcik
2002; Clark and Wójcik 2003), – distance would be
a significant obstacle in exercising control. Local
embeddedness (Granovetter 1985; see also
Glückler 2001; Hess 2004), characterised by the
presence of locational assets, localised capabilities
and, not least, the possibility for frequent personal
or “handshake” interaction, face-to-face communi-
cation and “emotional closeness” (Leamer and
Storper 2001; Storper and Venables 2004), also con-
tributes to the geographical concentration of
M&As.
The significance of agglomeration economies for
M&As in Germany is even more striking if only
the most important German M&A metropolitan
areas are taken into consideration. Their intrare-
gional transactions alone (i.e. not the M&As per-
formed between, but only within them) account for
close to a fifth of all intranational M&As. This fig-
ure climbs to 22.3 percent, if the top ten German
agglomerations are taken into consideration
(Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, Hanover and Bremen, in
addition to the six key nodes Frankfurt, Dus-
seldorf, Hamburg, Munich, Berlin and Cologne).
Overall, more than 55 percent of all intranational
transactions involved at least a firm located in one
of the six most important German centres of
M&As; and if, again, the top ten German urban
regions are taken into account, almost 70 percent
of the overall German M&A activity is concentrat-
ed in large metropolitan areas.
The second key characteristic of the German
M&A economic geography is the ‘interconnectiv-
ity’ of the largest metropolitan areas. In line with
Veltz’s (1996) archipelago economy, 33 percent of
all intranational M&As in Germany during the
1990s took place only within and between the six
largest German metropolitan areas. Moreover,
the share of intrametropolitan transactions kept
on growing throughout the decade. If only the
M&As conducted from the six key nodes are con-
sidered, the percentage rises to more than three
fifths of all transactions. This can be taken not
only as a strong indication of the increasing con-
centration of economic decision-making in a small
number of agglomerations, but also of the
strengthening of the interactions and linkages
between these points of control, at the expense of
their regional contexts.
The third important aspect of the spatial distribu-
tion of M&As in Germany is related to distance.
Once agglomeration factors are controlled for, cor-
porate transactions are more likely to happen
between nearby, rather than distant cities
(Rodríguez-Pose and Zademach 2003, 1912). This
insight corresponds to the findings of Wójcik (2003,
1455), who also demonstrates that geography must
be regarded as a crucial dimension in the German
model of corporate governance: “... proximity
breeds corporate ownership and control links, and
corporate governance, even at the subnational
level, is by no means spatially uniform.”That is, con-
sidered at the aggregate level, companies tend to be
financed and/or controlled by entities with nearby
headquarters.
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Territorial dynamics in the German M&A economy
These agglomerating and centralising trends are
confirmed by the mapping of the location quotient
MApR-I(gdp). In the years around and immediately
after reunification (1990–94), the overall German
geography of M&As was characterised by marked
differences between the spatial distribution of
acquiring and target firms (Figure 1). The restructur-
ing and the reorganisation of production in the for-
mer German Democratic Republic triggered a sig-
nificant number of intranational M&As between
western and eastern firms, with western firms as the
main acquirers. Relative to the GDP of the region,
firms in eastern Germany became the primary target
of western firms.All east German counties had more
transactions per region than the German average.
Leipzig (with a location quotient of 3.60), Dresden
(3.05) and Chemnitz (2.64), the three regions of
Saxony, Magdeburg (3.44) and Halle (3.05), both in
Saxony-Anhalt, as well as Thuringia (3.09) and
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (2.88) were the
main target regions during this period.
Acquiring firms, on the other hand, were primarily
located in the large west German metropolitan
areas. Berlin6, with a location quotient of 1.79 was
top, followed closely by Frankfurt (1.71), Düsseldorf
(1.70) and Hamburg (1.70). Yet some eastern coun-
ties, such as Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania
(1.10), Magdeburg (1.24), Halle (1.28) and Leipzig
(1.52) also had above average ratios. In spite of the
performance of these four eastern regions, the post-
unification period was characterised by a significant
overall loss of corporate control in the whole of east
Germany.
The second half of the 1990s saw a sharp turnaround
in this process. The east-west dimension of the M&A
market during the first half of the decade lost all rel-
evance and was substituted by a complete domi-
nance of large urban areas (Figure 2).
From the acquisition point of view, the panorama is
one of continuity. Hamburg (2.02), Düsseldorf (1.80)
and Frankfurt (1.73) represent the three most impor-
tant acquiring centres, while Munich, Cologne,
Berlin, Bremen, Stuttgart and Rhinehesse-Palatinate
also punch above their economic weight. The only
significant change is the increase in the relative share
of the acquiring firms in these regions. The picture
changes radically, however, on the target side. With
the sole exceptions of Halle, Magdeburg and Leipzig
– remnants of the earlier east-west trend – M&A tar-
get firms become increasingly concentrated in large
metropolitan areas. The greatest relative concentra-
tion of targets is found in the two city states of
Hamburg (1.84) and Bremen (1.76). Frankfurt
(1.41), Düsseldorf (1.34), Berlin and Munich (both
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Figure 1
Acquiring firms and M&A targets in Germany
6 Note that the location quotients for the three German city states
Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg might be slightly overestimated, as
within their administrative borders there is no hinterland.
1.24) as well as Cologne (1.13) also score above the
national average. During the second half of the
decade, the largest German metropolitan areas had
thus become the most dominant locations both for
acquiring headquarters and target firms, stressing
the increasing emergence of an archipelago econo-
my scenario.
Conclusion
Corporate takeovers and mergers are a key charac-
teristic of the information-based and globalised
economy of the late 20th and early 21st centuries.
They also reflect the ongoing restructuring of pro-
duction processes in an increasingly competitive
environment. Taking the German economy as a case
study, this paper has analysed the dynamics of
M&As and the extent to which the most recent wave
of corporate consolidation has led to a profound
relocation of economic activity and to an increasing
concentration of corporate power and control in
large urban areas. Agglomeration economies and, to
a lesser extent, geographical distance seem to have
been the main factors shaping the restructuring of
the territorial distribution of economic power and
activity in Germany. From this perspective, M&As
represent both a symptom and a cause of the
increasing concentration of economic decision-mak-
ing in large urban areas and of the rise of the eco-
nomic power of metropolitan areas.
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